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DOES HIGH INEQUALITY ATTRACT HIGH SKILLED
IMMIGRANTS?*
Eric D. Gould and Omer Moav
This study examines how the sources and levels of income inequality affect how a country attracts and
retains high skilled workers. With parameter values that yield realistic levels of emigration, our model
shows that emigration rates increase with education when the returns to education are higher
abroad. However, the relationship between unobservable skills (‘residual wages’) and emigration can
display an inverse U-shaped pattern, if unobservable skills are composed of both ‘general’ and
‘country-specific’ skills. Using data on Israeli emigrants before they decide to emigrate, we find
strong empirical evidence in support of the model’s predictions.
This study examines whether income inequality within a country attracts highly skilled
workers from foreign countries, as well as affecting incentives for highly skilled natives
to move abroad. In particular, we analyse how these incentives depend on the sources
of inequality, not just the levels. A seminal paper by Borjas (1987) demonstrates that
skilled workers are more likely than less-skilled workers to leave a country with a low
return to skill and move to a country with a higher return to skill.1 The reverse is also
true – a lower skilled individual is more likely than a highly skilled worker to leave a
country with a high return to skill and move to a country with a lower return to skill.
These predictions are quite intuitive – skilled individuals benefit from high returns to
skill since they are at the top of the skill distribution, while less-skilled individuals
benefit from lower returns to skill since they are at the bottom of the skill distribution.
Given that the returns to skill are an important component of overall inequality, a
more compressed wage distribution tends to encourage the most skilled individuals to
leave (‘positive selection’), while a more dispersed wage distribution entices lower
skilled individuals to leave (‘negative selection’). These insights show how incentives
for highly skilled individuals to emigrate depend on a country’s relative level of
inequality.
Using unique data on Israeli emigrants before they move abroad, we present new
evidence about the patterns of emigrant selection along different dimensions of skill.
Similar to the case in most countries, the propensity to emigrate from Israel increases
with education, which is consistent with the idea that educated individuals are attracted
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to the higher returns to education in the US, which is the main destination for
emigrant Israelis. However, emigration rates do not rise with wages or residual wages
(controlling for education, age, occupation and other controls), despite the higher
levels of residual wage inequality in the US. In fact, Israelis in the middle of the
residual wage distribution appear the most likely to emigrate – leading to an inverse
U-shaped pattern between residual wages and the propensity to emigrate. This finding
suggests that the most talented individuals, according to their residual wages, are not
necessarily the ones most tempted to move to a country with high wage inequality like
the US.
To examine how the patterns of emigrant selection in terms of education versus
residual wages can be different from the same country, we develop and test a model
based on the idea that inequality is generated by different types of skills. Some skills are
‘general’ in the sense that they can be easily transported and rewarded in a foreign
country, and some skills are ‘country-specific’ in nature and, therefore, are not easily
transferred to another country. Education and intelligence are examples of ‘general
skills’ which are likely to be remunerated in any country, while examples of ‘country-
specific’ skills include personal connections, local knowledge of market conditions and
regulations, language-specific skills, licences which are country-specific, rents from
political ties or labour market rigidities, firm-specific skills (unless the firm operates in
both countries) and certain instances of luck (being at the right place at the right
time). Although ‘luck’ is typically not considered a form of human capital, it affects a
person’s wage and potentially plays an important role in determining how much of an
income loss is associated with moving abroad.
While some skills, like education, are observable to the econometrician in many data
sets, information about the skill composition of a person’s residual wage is not. As a
result, workers with the same residual wage could have very different types of skills and,
therefore, face different incentives to emigrate. For example, one worker may have a
high residual wage that is due to abundant general skills that could be rewarded in a
foreign country, which creates a strong incentive to move to a country with a larger
reward for general skills. Meanwhile, a worker with a high residual wage due to
abundant country-specific skills will lose most of his success in a foreign country, and
thus is unlikely to move abroad.
This framework produces familiar predictions about emigrant selection in terms of
an observable general skill like education – countries with a relatively low return to
education will lose educated workers to countries with income inequality based on
larger returns to education. Our main contribution is to see how this finding interacts
with the selection process based on the residual wage. The model shows that the
relationship between residual wages and the probability to emigrate can be monotonic
or non-monotonic. When the return to unobservable general skills is lower abroad
than in the home country, the probability of emigrating declines with residual wages
since both components of the residual wage (the general and the country-specific
components) are rewarded better in the home country. In other words, even if income
inequality in Country A is very high, a person with a high residual wage in Country B
will not be enticed to move there if Country A’s high level of inequality is due to skills
which cannot be acquired before moving there.
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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The more interesting case, however, is when the return to general skills is higher
abroad but the parameters are restricted so that emigration rates are strictly positive
but not very high, which is consistent with our empirical findings. Under these
restrictions, the relationship between residual wages and emigration is an inverse
U-shaped function. That is, inequality in Country A due to higher returns to
unobserved general skills will attract individuals from Country B that are likely to be in
the middle of the residual wage distribution.
The intuition is straightforward – a higher return to unobservable general skills in a
foreign country implies that the benefits of emigration increase with a person’s level of
unobservable general skill but a higher level of unobserved country-specific skill raises
the costs of emigration, since these skills will be rendered obsolete. Therefore, a larger
amount of unobserved general skill relative to country-specific skill raises the probability
that a person emigrates. Furthermore, a larger proportion of individuals have a high
relative level of general to country-specific skills in the middle of the residual wage
distribution than in the tails. This is due to the fact that those at the bottomof the residual
wage distribution have very little of both types of skills, while those at the top have high
levels of both. Thus, individuals who are most likely to emigrate, those that have a high
level of unobservable general skills versus country-specific skills, are more likely to be in
the middle of the residual wage distribution than in the tails.
The basic patterns in our Israeli data support the main predictions of our model.
Specifically, the probability of emigrating increases with education, which is consistent
with a higher return to education in theUS relative to Israel. Also, the overall relationship
between residual wages and emigration displays the inverse U-shaped pattern described
above.However, we also test themodel further by seeingwhether thepatterns of selection
vary systematically with variation across different sectors (industries and occupations) in
the differences between Israel and the US in the returns to observable (education) and
unobservable skills. Our findings suggest that this is indeed the case: a lower return to
unobservable general skills (proxied by the sector’s residual wage variance) in Israel
versus theUS entices Israelis with higher residual wages to leave the country. Also, we find
that emigrants aremore positively selected in terms of their education in industries with a
lower relative return to education in Israel versus the US.
Most of the existing literature on immigrant selection examines the selection of
immigrants according to levels of education, with a large share dedicated to the study of
Mexican immigrants to the US. According to the Borjas model, Mexican emigrants
should be negatively selected on education since the return to education is higher in
Mexico than theUS. Themost prominent paper in this literature is Chiquiar andHanson
(2005), who find that Mexican immigrants to the US come from the middle of the
education distribution, which they explain by adding migration costs which decline with
education to the model.2 As a result, Mexican workers at the bottom of the distribution
2 They argue that migration costs decline with education due to the effect of education on the ability to
overcome bureaucratic requirements, the lower time costs required to earn enough money to pay the fixed-
costs of moving, and fewer credit constraints on educated individuals. Chiswick (1999) also argues that
moving costs decline with education, which tends to produce positive selection in emigrants. Orrenius and
Zavodny (2005) find similar results for illegal immigrants from Mexico. McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) show
that the selection of Mexican immigrants becomes more negative from areas in Mexico which have lower
overall migration costs (i.e. stronger migration networks).
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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are less likely to move due to their higher costs of moving, while those at the top of the
distribution are less likely to move due to the higher returns to education in Mexico.
In contrast to the Mexican case, Israeli emigrants display ‘positive selection’, which is
similar to the experience of most other countries (Grogger and Hanson, 2011).
Therefore, our data are consistent with the basic model with or without the assumption
that migration costs decline with education, and this additional assumption cannot
help to explain the inverse U-shaped pattern regarding selection on residual wages.
The literature on the selection of emigrants from countries other than Mexico
presents a mixed picture in terms of being consistent with Borjas (1987).3 This is
largely due to the general pattern whereby highly educated individuals leave less
developed countries with high returns to education and move to developed countries
with lower returns to education. This pattern is not consistent with the predictions of
the basic model in Borjas (1987). However, there may be many confounding factors in
this type of empirical analysis, since there is large variation across countries in many
factors which may influence the size and direction of the selection – such as language
barriers, proximity, moving costs, immigration policy, visa requirements, etc. This may
be one reason why the evidence in favour of the Borjas (1987) model is stronger in
studies looking at internal migration (Borjas et al., 1992; Dahl, 2002).
Our study is not affected by cross-country differences in factors which influence the
selection of emigrants, since we exploit variation in the patterns of selection across
sectors within one country. Moreover, we examine emigrant selection based on
education and unobservable skill (residual wages), and not just on education which is
the focus of the studies mentioned above. To do this requires information on the
wages of immigrants before they move, which is rare to find.
A notable exception is Akee (2010) who exploits information from a sample of
individuals from Micronesia who were found to be immigrants in the US. Akee (2010)
finds that immigrants to the US are positively selected in terms of education and log
wages but does not examine whether the relationship is non-linear. However,
the results in Akee (2010) demonstrate the importance of using information
on immigrants before they move to evaluate the direction and size of immigrant
selection – by showing that a conventional approach in the literature that compares the
wages of immigrants in the US to the wages of non-immigrants in Micronesia yields the
opposite conclusion about immigrant selection. In addition, we build on Akee (2010)
by examining whether variation in the returns to education and unobservable skill
3 This literature includes Borjas (1987), who uses data on US immigrants from 41 countries in the 1970
and 1980 US censuses and finds weak evidence that the source country’s income inequality is negatively
related to immigrant wages. See also Borjas (1991, 1999). Cobb-Clark (1993) finds similar results for female
immigrants. Feliciano (2005) examines 32 immigrant groups in the US and finds that all but one group
(immigrants from Puerto Rico) are positively selected in terms of education. However, Feliciano (2005) finds
an insignificant relationship between inequality and the degree of positive selection from the source country.
Grogger and Hanson (2011) examine the sorting of immigrants to 15 OECD countries from 102 source
countries and find that immigrants in host countries are positively selected in relation to the source country
when the education gap in wages between the host and source countries increases. However, when the
education wage gap is measured in logs, they find evidence in favour of negative selection when the return to
education is higher in the source country. Belot and Hatton (2012) examine immigrants in 29 OECD
countries from 80 source countries and find little evidence in favour of the main prediction in Borjas (1987).
Only after considering the poverty constraints in poor countries do they find evidence in support of Borjas
(1987).
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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across sectors can explain the patterns of emigrant selection on each dimension across
sectors.
The article is organised as follows. The next Section develops a theoretical model of
emigration based on general and ‘country-specific’ skills. Section 2 presents the data
on Israeli emigration and the aggregate selection patterns which are consistent with
the model. The model’s predictions are tested further in Section 3 by exploiting
variation across sectors in the returns to education and unobservable skill in Israel
versus the US. Section 4 concludes the analysis.
1. A Model of Emigration with Country-specific Skills
Building on Borjas (1987), we develop a model that analyses how the incentives to
emigrate interact with the different sources of income and inequality. The model is
based on the decision by each individual living in the home country (country 0)
whether to emigrate to the host country (country 1). The wage in the home country,
w0, is determined by the individual’s level of education, e, and by his unobservable
skills. Unobservable skills are composed of skills which are country-specific, s, and skills
which are more general, g. Country-specific skills are rendered obsolete if the person
emigrates, while general skills are rewarded according to the return to general skill in
the host country. Education is observable, and following the literature, is considered a
general skill. An individual’s wage, w0, in the source country is modelled by:
w0 ¼ a0 þ e þ g þ s; (1)
where a0 is the intercept of the wage function and is constant across individuals.
Without loss of generality, the returns to each type of skill (e, g and s) are normalised to
one in the home country. The two unobservable components, s and g, are distributed
independently with a uniform distribution over the unit interval:
sU½0; 1;
g U½0; 1:
Using the uniform distribution simplifies the analysis but is not crucial for the
qualitative results. Figures A1–A3 in the online Appendix A present simulations that
show that the main results hold for the normal distribution and when we allow for a
negative or positive (but not perfect) correlation between s and g.
In the host country (country 1), the individual’s wage (net of the direct cost of
moving) would be:
w1 ¼ a1 þ b1e þ c1g  f ; (2)
if the individual decides to emigrate, where a1 is the intercept of the wage function in
country 1, b1 and c1 are the returns to e and g in country 1, and f is the direct cost of
relocating which is considered identical across all individuals.4 The key assumption is
4 Migration costs include costs associated with themove and the time costs of assimilation (Hamermesh and
Trejo, 2013). Several papers model the cost of moving as a decreasing function of education (Chiswick, 1999;
Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005), in order to obtain a positive selection of emigrants, despite lower returns to skill
in the host country. Adding this assumption to the model does not qualitatively alter the results and does not
help us understand the observed inverse U-shaped pattern of emigration rates in terms of residual wages.
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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that some skills are valued more in the home country versus the host country, which we
simplify by setting the return to unobserved country-specific skills, s, to zero in country
1. If c1 > 1, the return to general skills is higher in the host country, otherwise it is
lower. If c1 is much lower than 1, then ‘general skills’ are essentially country-specific
skills. Therefore, the cases of interest that are analysed below are for a sufficiently
large c1.
Following the framework developed by Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987), the decision
to emigrate is based on income maximisation.5 Therefore, individuals emigrate if and
only if w1 > w0. Based on (1) and (2), this condition holds if and only if:
be þ cg[ a þ s; (3)
where a = (a0  a1) + f is the total fixed-cost of emigration (the difference in the
constant plus the direct cost of relocating), b = b1  1, and c = c1  1. The
parameters b and c are the differences in the returns between country 1 and country
0 to education and general unobserved skills, respectively. (Note that since b1 ≥ 0 and
c1 ≥ 0, it follows that b ≥ 1 and c ≥ 1.) Hence, the RHS of (3), a + s, is the total
emigration cost including the loss of specific skills and the fixed cost of emigrating
(which could be negative), whereas the LHS, be + cg, is the gain from emigration.
Naturally, an individual decides to emigrate if the gain is greater than the costs. If b or
c is negative, then education or general skills respectively contribute to the cost of
moving rather than to the gain of moving. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, we
restrict the return to general skills in the host country to be less than twice the return
in the home country. Assumption (a):
c\1:
This assumption is not crucial and does not limit the model’s range of possible results.
As stated above, an individual’s unobservable component of income in country 0 is
represented by s + g. This sum is called the individual’s ‘residual wage’ and is denoted
by ~w; i.e.
~w ¼ s þ g :
Since both s and g are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, it follows
that the residual wage, ~w; is distributed between 0 and 2, and under the
assumption that the two distributions are independent, the probability density
function of ~w is:
f ð ~wÞ ¼ ~w for ~w 1;
2 ~w for ~w[ 1:

(4)
We now derive the probability of emigration for any individual with a given level of
education e and a given residual wage, ~w. We condition on these two variables since e
and w0 are observable to the econometrician and thus ~w can be calculated. In contrast,
the individual components of the residual wage, g and s, are not observable to the
econometrician. Since the distributions of g and s are uniform and independent, it
5 This assumption is consistent with the evidence in Gould and Moav (2007) that Israeli emigrants are
motivated largely by economic considerations, and less by political considerations or schooling decisions.
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follows that for any given ~w; g is uniformly distributed in its feasible range.
In particular, the conditional distribution of g, given ~w; is:
g U½0; ~w for ~w\1;
g U½ ~w  1; 1 for ~w 1: (5)
These properties allow for a straightforward calculation of the probability that an
individual with any given ~w and e will emigrate, which we denote by pð~w; eÞ: From (3),
and noting that s ¼ ~w  g ; it follows that:
pð~w; eÞ  pðcg þ be[ a þ sj ~wÞ
¼ p g[ a  be þ ~w
1þ c
 ~w
 
:
(6)
In the following two Propositions, we study the properties of the probability of
emigration, pð~w; eÞ; with respect to ~w: In the first Proposition, we focus on the case that
c is positive – the return to general skills is higher in the host country. The second
Proposition examines the opposite case where c < 0. Both Propositions cover all
possible outcomes for any b (positive or negative) and any level of education, e. In both
Propositions, the function pð~w; eÞ takes different forms for different levels of be  a,
which we refer to as the ‘net education incentive’ to emigrate, since it represents the
return or cost associated with emigrating that stems only from a person’s education level
and fixed-cost of moving. The net education incentive is independent of ~w and it
increases with education, if the return to education is higher abroad (b > 0), and falls
with education if the return to education is higher at the home country (b < 0).
Therefore, as the ranges of be  a increase in the Propositions below, these ranges refer
to increasing levels of education if b > 0 and decreasing levels of education if b < 0.
PROPOSITION 1. (The properties of pð~w; eÞ; when the return to general skills are higher in the
host country). Under Assumption (a) for c > 0:
(i) For be  a ≤  c:
The probability that an individual emigrates is 0.
(ii) For be  a 2 (c, 0]:
1. The probability that an individual with education e and wage residual ~w emigrates
is:
pð ~w; eÞ ¼
0 for ~w a  be
c
c ~w  a þ be
ð1þ cÞ~w for ~w 2

a  be
c
; 1

1þ c a þ be  ~w
ð2 ~wÞð1þ cÞ for ~w 2 ½1; be  a þ 1þ cÞ
0 for ~w be  a þ 1þ c
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
where:
2. pð~w; eÞ is continuous
3.
a  be
c
2 ½0; 1Þ
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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4. be  a + 1 + c 2 (1,2)
5. pð~w; eÞ is increasing and concave with respect to ~w for ~w 2 a  be
c
; 1
 
6. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and concave with respect to ~w for ~w2ð1;be  a þ 1þ cÞ
(iii) For be  a 2 (0,1  c]
1. The probability that an individual with education e and wage residual ~w emigrates
is:
pð ~w; eÞ ¼
1 for ~w be  a
c ~w  a þ be
ð1þ cÞ ~w for ~w 2 ðbe  a; 1
1þ c a þ be  ~w
ð2 ~wÞð1þ cÞ
for ~w 2 ð1; be  a þ 1þ cÞ
0 for ~w be  a þ 1þ c
8>>><
>>>:
where:
2. pð~w; eÞ is continuous
3. be  a 2 (0,1)
4. be  a + 1 + c 2 (1,2]
5. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and convex with respect to ~w for ~w 2 ðbe  a; 1
6. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and concave with respect to ~w for ~w2ð1;be  a þ 1þ cÞ
(iv) For be  a 2 (1c,1)
1. The probability that an individual with education e and wage residual ~w emigrates
is:
pð~w; eÞ ¼
1 for ~w be  a
c~w  a þ be
ð1þ cÞ~w for ~w 2 ðbe  a; 1
1þ c a þ be  ~w
ð2 ~wÞð1þ cÞ for ~w 2 ð1; ða  be þ 1þ cÞ=cÞ
1 for ~wða  be þ 1þ cÞ=c
8>>>><
>>>:
where:
2. pð~w; eÞ is continuous
3. be  a 2 (1  c,1)
4. (a  be + 1 + c)/c 2 (1,2)
5. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and convex with respect to ~w for ~w 2 ðbe  a; 1
6. pð~w;eÞ is increasing and convex with respect to ~w for ~w2ð1;ðaþcbeþ1Þ=cÞ
(v) For be  a ≥ 1
The probability that an individual emigrates is 1.
The Proposition follows from (5) and (6).
Proposition 1 states that, for c > 0, the shape of the function pð~w; eÞ changes with
be  a. For b > 0, an increase in the relative return to education in the host country, b,
or the level of education, e, will increase the probability of emigration and change the
shape of the emigration function with respect to the wage residual, ~w: For b < 0, the
same shift occurs with a decline in education.
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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In particular, moving from part i to v of the Proposition as be  a increases: no one
emigrates when be  a ≤  c; the probability to emigrate, pð~w; eÞ; is an inverse
U-shaped function with respect to the residual wage, ~w; for be  a 2 (c, 0]; pð~w; eÞ
monotonically declines with ~w for be  a 2 (0,1  c]; pð~w; eÞ is U-shaped with
respect to ~w for be  a 2 (1  c,1); and finally, all individuals emigrate for
be  a ≥ 1.
To understand these patterns better consider individuals that are at the extreme
levels of the residual wage distribution. For individuals with the lowest possible residual
wage (~w ¼ 0Þ; both unobservable skills are at their minimum values: s = g = 0. For
these individuals, there is no variation in the composition of unobservable skills, so
they all make the same decision for any level of education (i.e. for any level of be  a).
There is a discrete jump from a probability zero of emigration to a probability of one
when the education level, e, crosses the threshold a/b. Similarly, for the highest
possible residual wage (~w ¼ 2Þ; both unobservable skills are at their highest possible
values: s = g = 1. For these individuals, there is again no variation in the composition
of unobservable skills, so they all make the same decision: a discrete jump from a
probability zero of emigration to one as e crosses above the threshold (a + 1  c)/b.
Changes in the probability of emigrating are more gradual with changes in e as the
residual wage is closer to the middle of the distribution (~w is closer to one). This is the
case because there is more variation in the composition of the residual near the centre
of the distribution.
This helps understand our model’s results, in particular, the inverse U-shape
relationship between the residual wage and the emigration probability that is found in
our data and predicted by our model for be  a 2 (c, 0], and c > 0. A necessary
condition for a non-monotonic relationship is that some unobserved skills are
rewarded more in the home country, while others are rewarded more in the host
country, which is the case with c > 0. In addition, when be  a 2 (c, 0], the ‘net
education incentive’ is not sufficient to induce emigration by itself. To induce
emigration, a person’s incentive to emigrate must be augmented by a sufficiently high
level of general skill, which is rewarded more in the host country. At the same time,
high levels of country-specific skills would work in the opposite direction, reducing the
probability of moving. Therefore, individuals who decide to emigrate are those with
relatively high general skills, g, and low country-specific skills, s. Individuals with a low
residual wage have low levels of both general and country-specific skills (g and s) and,
therefore, do not emigrate. Similarly, individuals with a high residual wage have high
levels of both general and country-specific skills and, therefore, have low rates of
emigration. Individuals with a high g and low s – those who would benefit the most
from emigration – are more likely to be found in the middle of the residual wage
distribution.
To be more specific, the middle of the residual wage distribution contains
individuals with varying levels of s and g. Those with similar levels of both unobserved
skills, s and g, or high levels of s versus g, will behave similar to those at the tails of the
distribution since the loss of country-specific skills and the fixed-costs of moving will
prevent them from leaving. However, in the middle of the distribution, there is also a
group of individuals with high levels of g relative to s. For those individuals, the return
to emigration is high enough to produce the largest rate of emigration within the
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
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population. As a result, the rate of emigration is larger in the middle of the residual
wage distribution for moderate levels of be  a.6
It is important to note that the inverseU-shapepattern of emigration crucially depends
on our assumption that both types of unobservable skills (g and s) play important roles in
determining the variation in residual wages. If the variation or magnitudes of country-
specific skills are negligible, an increase in the residual wage is largely a product of more
general skills. In this case, the emigration probability monotonically increases with the
wage residual when c > 0 (and decreases if c < 0). Thus, the inverse U-shape is one
possible outcome, which depends on the net education incentive lying in a moderate
range (be  a 2 (c, 0]) and the existence of significant variation across individuals in
both types of unobservable skills – general and country-specific.
When the net education incentive to emigrate (be  a) increases beyond 0,
Proposition 1 states (for c > 0) that the inverse U-shaped pattern turns into a
decreasing function followed by a U-shaped function. This is the case where the net
education incentive to emigrate is relatively strong and therefore, a high s relative to g
is required to prevent emigration. Similar to the logic behind the inverse U-shape,
individuals with a high s relative to g are more likely to be found in the middle of the
residual distribution relative to the tails, thus creating a U-shaped function. This
finding implies that there could exist some levels of education for which a majority of
individuals decide to emigrate, in particular those with high or low wage residuals.
The reason for the monotonic decline in the probability of emigration with the wage
residual for low but positive levels of the net education incentive (be  a) follows. For
individuals with ~w ¼ 0; there is no loss or gain from unobserved skills when emigrating
and, therefore, they decide to move when be  a > 0. Individuals at the other end of
the distribution, with ~w ¼ 2; do not move as the gain from the higher return on their
high general skills is insufficient to compensate for the loss of country specific skills
when emigrating. This is an outcome of the fact that an emigrant loses the entire
return on specific skills and gains only the difference in the return to general skills
between the host country and the home country, which we restrict to less than one.
However, a further increase in be  a will induce individuals with ~w ¼ 2 to emigrate
and the pattern of emigration will then become U-shaped. For a sufficiently high
be  a, such that individuals with the highest residual wage choose to emigrate, only
individuals with low general skills and high country-specific skills would not emigrate.
As mentioned above, these individuals are located at the middle of the residual wage
distribution, and therefore, a U-shaped pattern emerges.
Finally, in the last part of Proposition 1, the net education incentive to emigrate is so
high (be  a ≥ 1  c) that considerations stemming from the residual wage are not
important, leading all individuals to emigrate.
6 It should be noted that the inverse U-shaped relationship between the residual wage and the probability
of emigration does not depend on our assumption that the two components of the residual, s and g, are not
correlated. The U-shape patterns persist unless the two are perfectly, positively correlated (which would
produce positive selection). However, the U-shaped pattern becomes flatter when the correlation becomes
more positive. Interestingly, a negative correlation will strengthen the inverse U-shape pattern, since a more
negative correlation would increase the variance in the distribution of s and g in the middle of the
distribution of their sum, and hence a higher probability of g exceeding its threshold level for triggering
emigration.
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The following Proposition examines the case where the return to unobserved
general skill is higher in the home country (c < 0).
PROPOSITION 2. (The properties of pð~w; eÞ when the return to general skills are higher in the
home country). Under Assumption (a) for c < 0:
(i) For be  a ≤ 0
The probability that an individual emigrates is 0.
(ii) For be  a 2 (0,c)
1. The probability that an individual emigrates is:
pð~w; eÞ ¼
1 for ~w be  a
c~w þ be  a
1þ cð Þ~w for ~w 2

be  a; be  ac

0 for ~w be  ac
8>>><
>>>:
where:
2. pð~w; eÞ is continuous
3. be  a 2 (0,c)
4. (be  a)/c 2 (bea,1)
5. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and convex with respect to ~w for ~w 2

be  a; be  ac

(iii) For be  a 2 [c,1)
1. The probability that an individual emigrates is:
pð~w; eÞ ¼
1 for ~w be  a
c~w þ be  a
ð1þ cÞ~w for ~w 2 ðbe  a; 1Þ
1þ cþ be  a  ~w
ð2 ~wÞð1þ cÞ for ~w 2 ½1; be  a þ 1þ cÞ
0 for ~w be  a þ 1þ c
8>>><
>>>:
where:
2. pð~w; eÞ is continuous
3. be  a 2 (0,1)
4. be  a + 1 + c 2 [1,2)
5. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and convex with respect to ~w for ~w 2 ðbe  a; 1Þ
6. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and concave with respect to ~w for ~w 2 ð1;beaþ1þcÞ
(iv) For be  a 2 [1,1c)
1. The probability that an individual emigrates is:
pð~w; eÞ ¼
1 for ~w be  a  1 cc
1þ c a þ be  ~w
2 ~wð Þ 1þ cð Þ for ~w 2
be  a  1 c
c ; be  a þ 1þ c
 
0 for ~w be  a þ 1þ c
8>>><
>>>:
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where:
2. pð~w; eÞ is continuous
3.
be  a  1 c
c [ 1
4. be  a þ 1 þ c[ be  a  1 cc
5. be  a + 1 + c ≤ 2
6. pð~w; eÞ is decreasing and concave with respect to ~w for
2 be  a  1 cc ; be  a þ 1þ c
 
(v) For be  a ≥ 1  c
The probability that an individual decides to emigrate is 1.
The Proposition follows from (5) and (6).
In the case studied in Proposition 2, where the return to unobserved general skill is
lower in the host country (c < 0), the relationship between the residual wage and the
emigration probability is (weakly) negative. In this scenario, both types of unobservable
skill (g and s) receive a higher reward in the home country and, thus, larger
combinations of these two skills (i.e. a larger residual wage) lower the emigration
probability. Therefore, the highest residual wage will have the lowest probability of
emigrating when the return to general skill is higher at home.
As noted above, there is no variation in the combination of unobservable skills (s and
g) when the residual wage is at the minimum or maximum values. In these corners,
every individual, given be  a, makes the same decision. Therefore, if the net
education incentive (be  a) is high enough to induce the least likely individual (with
the maximum residual wage) to emigrate, then all individuals at that education level
will emigrate. Similarly, if the net education incentive is too low to induce the most
likely person to emigrate (someone with the minimum residual wage), then no one
with that level of education will emigrate. Between these two extreme cases, for any
given level of education, individuals with the maximum residual wage do not emigrate,
those with the minimum residual wage emigrate and the probability to emigrate
monotonically declines with the wage residual, ~w.
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that a non-monotonic relationship between the
residual wage and the emigration probability can only be obtained if some skills have a
higher return in the home country (i.e. ‘country specific skill’), while other skills are
rewarded more in the host country (‘general skills’). However, even when c < 0
(Proposition 2), the relationship between total wages and the emigration probability is
not necessarily monotonic (for b > 0), as a higher wage that is a result of higher
education will increase the emigration probability, whereas a higher wage resulting
from a higher residual will decrease this probability.
We now examine the effect of education on the shape of the probability function of
emigrating, pð ~w; eÞ. Clearly, if the return to education is higher in the host country
(b > 0), the model will generate positive selection on education: the probability of
emigration is (weakly) increasing with education. The opposite is true for b < 0. The
next Proposition, however, studies how this pattern interacts with the residual wage. To
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do this, we examine the derivatives of pð~w; eÞ with respect to e and the cross derivative
with respect to e and ~w. We study these derivatives for pð~w; eÞ 2 ð0; 1Þ since they are
zero otherwise.
PROPOSITION 3. (The effect of e on pð~w; eÞÞ: For pð ~w; eÞ 2 ð0; 1Þ:
(i)
dpð~w; eÞ
de
¼
b
ð1þ cÞ~w for ~w\1
b
ð1þ cÞð2 ~wÞ for ~w[ 1
8><
>>:
(ii)
d2pð~w; eÞ
ded ~w
¼
 b
1þ cð Þ~w2 for ~w\1
b
ð1þ cÞð2 ~wÞ2 for ~w[ 1:
8><
>:
The Proposition follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 states that the probability of emigrating increases with the level of
education if b > 0. In other words, emigrants are positively selected in terms of their
education if the return to education is higher in the host country. This result and its
mechanism is similar to the prediction in Borjas (1987). However, when b > 0, the
Proposition demonstrates that the marginal effect of e on pð ~w; eÞ is decreasing with ~w
for ~w\ 1, and increasing for ~w [ 1. Therefore, for the parameters for which an
inverse U-shaped pattern of pð ~w; eÞ with respect to ~w emerges (established in
Proposition 1), the probability of emigration is shifting up and flattening out as e
increases. Indeed, as shown in Proposition 1, the inverse U-shape turns into a U-shaped
pattern for higher levels of e.7
We now examine how emigration rates across different levels of ~w change as the
return to g increases in the host country relative to the home country. That is, we
examine the effect of c on emigration. It is straightforward to infer from Propositions 1
and 2 that pð~w; eÞ is increasing with c. However, the next Proposition establishes an
interesting result that under the conditions that pð~w; eÞ has an inverse U-shape with
respect to ~w; the distribution of pð~w; eÞ shifts to the right when c increases while
holding constant the probability of emigration for individuals with a mean wage
residual (by raising the fixed cost of emigration). Thus, the Proposition performs a
type of ‘mean preserving spread’ exercise.
PROPOSITION 4. (‘mean preserving spread’). Under Assumption (a), for c > a  be > 0:
A rise in the return to unobservable general skills in the host country versus the source country, c,
and in the fixed cost of emigrating, a, such that p(1, e) is held constant, generates a decline in
pð ~w; eÞ for ~w\ 1 and a rise in pð~w; eÞ for ~w [ 1:
7 If b > 0 and c < 0, pð~w; eÞ is decreasing with respect to ~w (established in Proposition 2) and the absolute
value of the slope is increasing for ~w\ 1 and decreasing for ~w [ 1 as e increases. The reverse is true for b < 0
and a sufficiently large c (otherwise pð~w; eÞ ¼ 0Þ:
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The proof of the Proposition is presented in the online Appendix B.
It follows from Proposition 4 that a rise in c, while holding p(1; e) constant,
generates a shift to the right in pð~w; eÞ around the point p(1; e). In other words, a
higher relative return to unobservable general skills abroad, while holding p(1; e)
constant, maintains the overall inverse U-shaped pattern of emigration according to
residual wages but shifts the whole curve to the right (raising emigration rates for those
with high residuals and lowering the rate for low residual wages).
The intuition for this result is as follows. For a given education level, e, the decision
to emigrate depends on both g and s. The benefit of emigration increases with g, while
the costs increase with s. Therefore, as ~w increases, the sum of s and g increases, which
implies that the threshold level of g, above which individuals choose to emigrate,
increases with ~w. To derive this formally, the condition for a person with any given ~w to
decide to emigrate, given by (3), can be rewritten as,
be þ cg[ a þ ~w  g ;
where ~w  g ¼ s: Rearranging implies that be þ ð1 þ cÞg [ a þ ~w: Therefore, for
any ~w and e, there exists a threshold level of g, denoted by g^ ð~w; eÞ, such that (3) holds
with equality:
g^ ð~w; eÞ ¼ a  be þ ~w
1þ c :
Hence, the threshold level of g is increasing with ~w and, therefore, a rise in the
difference in the return to general skills, c, has a stronger impact on individuals with
larger residual wages, ~w. This can also be seen from (3), where the marginal benefit of
emigrating with respect to c is equal to g. Therefore, those with higher g are more
sensitive to changes in c. This general result is independent of the specific ‘mean
preserving spread’ exercise performed in the proposition.8
Finally, we examine how the selection of emigrants is affected by changes in the
relative returns to education between the two countries. To do this, we derive the
probability of emigrating as a function of education:
pðeÞ ¼
Z2
0
pð~w; eÞf ð~wÞd ~w: (7)
We start with the case studied in Proposition 1 in which the return to general
unobservable skills is higher in the host country, c > 0.
PROPOSITION 5. (The properties of p(e) when the return to general skills are higher in the
host country). Under Assumption (a), for c > 0:
8 A rise in the fixed cost, a, has a negative effect on the emigration probability. However, this effect declines
(in absolute value) with ~w for ~w\ 1; in particular for ~w 2 a  be=c; 1ð Þ;d2pð~w; eÞ=dad~w ¼ ½1=~w2ðcþ 1Þ [ 0:
For ~w [ 1 the opposite is true. For ~w 2 ð1; 1 þ c  ða  beÞÞ, d2pð~w; eÞ=dad~w ¼ ½1=ðcþ 1Þðw  2Þ2\ 0:
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
1068 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ J U N E
(i) The probability of emigrating as a function of education is:
pðeÞ ¼
0 for be  a  c
ðc a þ beÞ2
2c
for be  a 2 ðc; 0
c=2 a þ be for be  a 2 ð0; 1 c;
2eab a2  2a  e2b2 þ 2ebþ 2c 1
2c
for be  a 2 ð1 c; 1Þ
1 for be  a 1
8>>>>><
>>>>>>:
where:
(ii) p(e) is continuous in e.
(iii) The probability of emigration is increasing with education if b > 0 and decreasing if
b < 0; it is convex with respect to education for low levels of education and concave for
high levels of education:
p0ðeÞ
¼ 0 for be  a\ c
[ 0 for be  a 2 ðc; 1Þ; b[ 0
\0 for be  a 2 ðc; 1Þ; b\0;
¼ 0 for be  a[ 1
8><
>>:
p00ðeÞ
¼ 0 for be  a\ c
[ 0 for be  a 2 ðc; 0Þ
¼ 0 for be  a 2 ð0; 1 cÞ:
\0 for be  a 2 ð1 c; 1Þ
¼ 0 for be  a[ 1
8>>><
>>:
The Proposition follows directly from (4) and (7) and Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 states, once again, that emigrants are positively selected in terms of
education if b > 0 and negatively if b < 0. It further shows that the shape of the
relationship between education and the probability of emigrating is convex for low
levels of education and concave for high levels of education.
We now study the case of a lower return to general skills in the host country, c < 0.
PROPOSITION 6. (The properties of p(e), when the return to general skills are higher in the
home country). Under Assumption (a), for c < 0:
(i) The probability of emigrating as a function of education is:
pðeÞ¼
0 for bea0
ðabeÞ2
2c
for bea2ð0;cÞ
c=2þbea for bea2 ½c;1Þ;
a22eab2acþ2aþ e2b2þ2ebc2ebþc2þ1
2c
for bea2 ½1;1cÞ
1 for bea1c
8>>>>><
>>>>>>:
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where:
(ii) p(e) is continuous in e
(iii) The probability of emigration is increasing with education if b > 0 and decreasing if
b < 0; it is convex with respect to education for low levels of education and concave for
high levels of education:
p0ðeÞ
¼ 0 for be  a\0
[ 0 for be  a 2 ð0; 1 cÞ; b[ 0;
\0 for be  a 2 ð0; 1 cÞ; b\0
¼ 0 for be  a[ 1 c
8>><
>:
p00ðeÞ
¼ 0 for be  a\0
[ 0 for be  a 2 ð0;cÞ
¼ 0 for be  a 2 ðc; 1Þ:
\0 for be  a 2 ð1; 1 cÞ
¼ 0 for be  a[ 1 c
8>><
>>>:
The Proposition follows directly from (4) and (7) and Proposition 2.
Proposition 6 shows that the qualitative shape of p(e) is independent of the sign of c.
As in Proposition 5, also when c < 0, emigrants are positively selected in terms of
education if b > 0 and negatively if b < 0, and the relationship between education and
the probability of emigrating is convex for low levels of education and concave for high
levels of education.
Overall, the model developed in this Section shows that the combination of education
and unobservable skills (general and country-specific) can generate rich patterns of
emigrant selection, including a non-monotonic effect of the residual wage on
emigration rates. Specifically, the model produces an inverse U-shape pattern between
the wage residual and emigration (Proposition 1) for moderate levels of the net
education incentive to emigrate: be  a 2 (c, 0]. In that range, a higher return to
education in the host country (b > 0) is not sufficient for (most) educated individuals to
emigrate. High unobserved general skills and low unobserved country-specific skills are
also required. This gives rise to the inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration
and residual wages. In addition, for the same range of be  a 2 (c, 0] and when c > 0
and b > 0, Proposition 5 predicts an increasing and convex relationship between
education and emigration. Furthermore, the probability of emigration increases with
the relative return to education in the host country, b, and so does the marginal effect of
education: the cross derivative of p(e) with respect to e and b is positive.
These results demonstrate how individuals with the same residual wage can face very
different incentives to emigrate, depending on the skill composition of their unobserv-
able skills. Moreover, the model shows how there may be a non-monotonic relationship
between emigration and skill based on many factors but the basic premise of the Borjas
model is still relevant – an increase in the returns to skill abroad shifts the emigration
curve in a way that intensifies the level of positive selection for both education and the
residual wage. In the next Section, we examine the empirical relevance of these
predictions using unique Israeli data on potential emigrants before they move.
Our focus, however, will be on the range of parameters that gives rise to the inverse
U-shaped relationship between emigration and residual wages, which is what we
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observe in the data. In addition, this range of parameters yields additional predictions
that are empirically supported:
(i) emigration rates are not zero for any particular education level or residual
wage;
(ii) emigration rates are not very high for any particular education level or
residual wage;
(iii) the return to education is higher in the foreign country relative to the host
country; and
(iv) the return to unobserved general skill is higher in the foreign country relative
to the host country.
As we show in the next Section, support for the last two predictions comes from our
findings that the return to education is estimated to be higher for the US relative to
Israel and the residual variance is higher in the US as well. The latter finding is
indicative of higher returns to unobserved general skill in the US versus Israel – an
inference which is consistent with the idea that the returns to observable (education)
and unobservable general skills behave similarly across countries. For all these reasons,
the range of parameters which yield the inverse U-shape relationship between
emigration and residual wages appears to be the most relevant for our empirical
analysis.
In the next Section, we describe our unique data on Israeli emigration and show how
the observed patterns of selection are consistent with our model’s findings. We test the
model’s predictions further in Section 3 by exploiting variation across sectors in the
returns to education and unobserved skill between Israel and the US.
2. The Data
The empirical analysis uses a unique data set composed of the 1995 Israeli census
merged with an indicator for whether each respondent died or left the country as of
2002 and as of 2004. If the person is considered a ‘mover’ (a person who has left
Israel), then the data set contains variables indicating the month and year when
this person is considered to have left the country permanently. Information on
whether the person left the country is obtained by the Israeli border police,
which closely monitors who is coming and going at the country’s points of entry and
exit. Therefore, one advantage of these data is that we do not have to worry about
counting illegal immigrants, which is typically very difficult to do using governmental
data in the host country (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999; Hanson, 2006).
Definingwho is an emigrant is not straightforward, sincemany individuals donot know
themselves if they will stay abroad for the long term. As a result, any definitionof a ‘mover’
is somewhat arbitrary. In our analysis, we use the official definition used by the Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics, which considers any individual as a ‘mover’ if he/she left the
country for at least a full year.9 By design, the variable for being a ‘mover’ is intended to
9 The Israel Central Bureau of Statistics received information from the Interior Ministry about who is
leaving the country, which the Interior Ministry collects at the airports and borders according to the personal
identification number.
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capture a long-term absence from the country. According to the algorithm used by the
Central Bureau of Statistics, a short visit back to Israel in themidst of a long-term absence
does not change the status from ‘mover’ to being a ‘non-mover’.
There are a few potential weaknesses of the data worth noting. First, the data set
does not indicate why a person leaves and whether the person intends to come
back. Therefore, although we mainly use the given measure of a ‘mover’ throughout
our analysis, we check the robustness of our results by using a more restrictive
definition of ‘mover’ – those who were considered a mover in 2002 and 2004. In
addition, as we discuss below, there is strong evidence to believe that the measure
we received is picking up moves which are indeed long term. A second weakness in
the data is that they do not contain information on where the person is living if he/
she resides outside of Israel. However, the Global Migrant Origin Database Version
4.0 indicates that the US is by far the most likely destination for Israeli emigrants.10
Therefore, we treat the US as the ‘host’ country of interest. To the extent that the
US is not the actual destination for a particular emigrant, this should bias the
results towards zero.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest from the 1995 Israeli census
are presented in Table 1. Since the focus of the study is to determine the selection of
emigrants in terms of their education and wages, we restrict the analysis to males with a
strong attachment to the labour force, who are old enough to finish their schooling
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Male Workers from the 1995 Israel Census
Mean SD
Mover 2004 0.016 0.126
Mover 2002 0.013 0.114
Returned 2002–4 (for movers 2002) 0.020 0.141
Left by end of 2000 (for movers 2004) 0.672 0.470
Education 13.011 3.187
Age 37.773 4.613
Married 0.898 0.303
Native 0.614 0.487
Age arrived in Israel (non-natives only) 20.344 13.274
Asia-Africa origin 0.466 0.499
European origin 0.480 0.500
Israeli origin 0.054 0.227
Number of children 2.130 1.366
Log wage (monthly) 8.605 0.593
Observations 40,713
Notes. The core sample used throughout the article and in this Table includes all male respondents between
the ages of 30 and 45 in the 1995 Israel census who were not self-employed, worked at least 30 hours a week
and worked at least six months in the previous 12 months. Wages are monthly wages in Israeli Shekels using
1995 prices.
10 The data in the Global Migrant Origin Database Version 4.0 are problematic since they are based on
country of birth and many Israelis were not born in Israel. Also, they do not distinguish between Jewish and
Arab Israelis, while this study focuses on the emigration status of the Jewish population. However, according
to the database, 122,591 Israelis moved to the US and the next highest country (excluding Arab countries) is
Canada with a total of 17,393. Therefore, the US is by far the most likely destination country for our sample.
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(Israelis typically finish their BA studies in their late twenties) but young enough so
that they are not leaving for retirement purposes. Specifically, we restrict the sample to
Jewish males between the ages of 30 and 45 who were not self-employed (so their
income measure is reliable), worked at least 30 hours a week, worked at least six
months in the previous year and are not ultra-orthodox.11
Table 1 shows that the overall rate of emigration as of 2004 in this sample stands at
1.6%, increasing from 1.3% in 2002. Over 67% of those characterised as ‘movers’ in
2004 emigrated by the end of 2000. In addition, only 2% of those characterised as a
‘mover’ in 2002 returned to Israel by the end of 2004. So, our measure of a ‘mover’
appears to be picking up longer term stays abroad.
Although the overall rate of emigration appears to be rather low at 1.6%, there are
stark differences across levels of education and wages. Figure 1 presents the rates of
emigration across different levels of education for native-born Israelis. The rate varies
from 0.65% for the least educated to 2.6% for those with an MA degree or higher.
Figures 2 shows a similar patterns for non-natives, although the magnitudes are much
higher.12
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Fig. 1. Native Israelis Leaving Israel by Education
11 The self-employed represent about 10% of the population of interest and their rate of emigration is
1.2% compared to 1.6% for the non-self-employed sample. The lower rate of emigration for the self-
employed is largely the result of lower emigration rates for those with more than a college degree: 2.9 for the
non-self-employed versus 1.6 for the self-employed. This latter result is most likely due to the idea that self-
employed people, especially the most educated, possess more country-specific skills versus salaried workers.
12 Gould and Moav (2007) show that the rate of emigration is very high for professors, scientists, doctors
and engineers. All of these groups are at least three times higher than teachers or workers in all the rest of the
occupations. Additional evidence that Israel suffers from a ‘Brain Drain’ is presented in Ben-David (2008).
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The positive relationship between education and the rate of emigration is consistent
with the predictions of the previous Section and the Borjas model if the returns to
education are higher in the US versus Israel. The findings in Table 2 suggest that this is
indeed the case. Using a similar sample from the majority population in the US and
Israel in the same period, the estimated return to a year of schooling is 10% for the US
and only 7.1% for Israel.13 Using dummy variables for education categories instead of
years of schooling, Table 2 shows that the return to a college degree (versus finishing
high school but not going to college) was 56.7% versus 39% in the US and Israel
respectively. The gap between college graduates and high school dropouts is much
larger for the US relative to Israel as well (100.1% versus 57.7%). Therefore, the returns
to education appear to be much larger in the US than Israel, which is likely to
contribute to the positive relationship between education and emigration in Figures 1
and 2. It is worth noting that this relationship is positive and significant after
controlling for a host of other demographic characteristics of the individual, as shown
in a regression in the fifth column of Table 2.
One potential explanation for the pattern exhibited in the figures could be that
individuals with higher education levels are more likely to spend time abroad
temporarily (sabbaticals, being stationed abroad by a firm or the government, etc.).
However, we find no evidence to support this idea. Figure 3 shows that there is no
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Fig. 2. Non-native Israelis Leaving Israel by Education
13 To estimate comparable returns to education in both countries, we restrict the sample to the majority
population in both countries. For the US, the sample includes White natives, which is ethnically
homogenous. For Israel, the sample includes the Jewish population. Since this population is characterised
by observable ethnic differences which can explain significant wage variation, we control for these differences
with the Israeli data in order to produce estimates of the return to education which are not confounded by
these factors (native versus non-native, Ashkenazic versus Sephardic).
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discernible relationship between education and the propensity to return between 2002
and 2004, given that a person was considered a ‘mover’ in 2002. The last two columns
of Table 2 confirm that there is no systematic pattern between ‘returning’ and
education levels even after controlling for other demographic characteristics and
wages.
Another potential explanation for the ‘positive’ selection of immigrants in terms of
education could be related to restricting the sample to those above the age of 30. If
less-educated Israelis tend to leave in their 20s while more educated individuals wait
until they finish college, the positive relationship in Figures 1 and 2 could be spurious.
However, Figure 4 shows that emigration rates as of 2004 for teenagers in 1995 increase
with their father’s education level. Therefore, the evidence suggests that emigrants are
indeed positively selected according to observable general skills-like education.14
However, the model in the previous Section highlights how the patterns of emigrant
selection differ for observable general skills like education versus unobservable skills –
which are a mixture of general and country-specific skills. Empirical support for this
idea is displayed in Figure 5, which presents the rates of emigration according to the
decile of the residual log wage distribution (estimated from the regression specified in
column 3 of Table 2). This Figure shows that the propensity to emigrate increases with
residual wages and then declines.15 This inverse U-shaped pattern is consistent with the
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Fig. 3. Returning to Israel from 2002–4 by Education
14 We abstract from the issue of return migration (Dustmann, 2003; Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). However,
Table 1 shows that only 2% of those that were considered movers in 2002 moved back by 2004. Given this low
number of returning Israelis and the finding that they are not disproportionately educated (as noted above),
we focus exclusively on the selection of the moving decision.
15 This pattern persists even after controlling for 12 industry categories or eight occupation groups.
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range of parameters in our model which yield small but positive emigration rates for
each level of education and residual wage as depicted in Figures 1, 2, and 5. Columns 5
and 6 of Table 2 show that this relationship persists after controlling for education
and demographic characteristics and also show directly that using a linear specification
for wages to explain the probability of emigrating yields misleadingly insignificant
results.
In the context of the model above, the inverse U-shaped pattern is consistent
with a higher return to unobserved general skills in the US relative to Israel. This
cannot be checked directly but there are two reasons why the return to unobserved
skills is likely to be higher in the US. First, the returns to all observable skills
(education, age, marital status) in Table 2 are higher in the US relative to Israel,
and thus, it is likely to be the case that unobserved skills behave similarly (Altonji
et al., 2005). This line of reasoning follows from the idea that the labour market in
the US is perhaps the freest and most competitive in the developed world and, as
such, highly rewards skills regardless of their direct observability in labour force
surveys. Secondly, our estimates of the residual variance in both countries (using
the specification in column 3 of Table 2) are 0.523 for the US and 0.498 for
Israel.16 This finding is consistent with a higher return to unobservable skill in the
US ( Juhn et al., 1993).
The overall patterns of emigrant selection based on observables (education) and
unobservables (residual wages) appear to be consistent with the model, since the
returns to education and unobserved general skills are likely to be higher in the US.
However, this might simply be a coincidence. To test the model, we need variation in
the returns to education and unobservable skill in the US versus Israel and then
examine whether that variation explains whether the selection becomes more positive
or negative in accordance with the model’s predictions. To do this, we estimate the
returns to education and the residual variance within sectors in the US and Israel using
the same specifications used for each sample in Table 2 (separate regressions for each
country-sector combination). Table 3 presents these estimates when the sectors are
defined by industry, and Table 4 presents the estimates when the sector is defined by
occupation. In the next Section, we will exploit variation across sectors in the relative
returns to education and unobservable general skill (Israel versus the US) to formally
test whether the aggregate patterns are influenced by the factors highlighted in our
model.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Selection on Observables (Education)
The goal of this subsection is to test whether a lower relative return to education in
Israel versus the US intensifies the positive relationship between education and the
propensity to leave Israel (Propositions 5 and 6). With information on each
individual in Israel before he makes the decision to leave the country or not, the
basic regression specification explains the probability that person i who works in
16 Income inequality is high in both countries (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006).
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sector j (before leaving Israel) decides to emigrate from Israel by the following
probit specification:
PrðMoverijÞ ¼ Uðc0 þ c1x i þ c2educi þ c3ðresidual wageÞij þ c4ðresidual wageÞ2ij
þ c5ðIsrael ROR EducÞj þ c6ðUS ROR EducÞj þ b1ðIsrael ROR EducÞj  educi
þ b2ðUS ROR EducÞj  educi þ ajÞ;
where Moverij is an indicator equal to one if the person emigrates from Israel and is
zero otherwise; xi is a vector of personal characteristics (age, marital status, number of
children in the household, an indicator for being a native Israeli, and age that the
person moved to Israel if he is not a native) and dummy variables for ethnicity
(European descent or Middle Eastern descent); educi is the number of completed years
of schooling by person i; residual wageij is the individual’s residual from a standard
Mincer-like wage regression from the 1995 Israel census using observations of workers
in sector j (regressing wages on education, age, age squared, marital status and
indicators for ethnic status and immigrant status); Israel ROR Educj is the estimated
return to education from the 1995 Israel census in sector j in the regression described
above for estimating the residual wage for each person in sector j; US ROR Educj is the
estimated return to education from the US CPS (combining 1994, 1995 and 1996)
within workers in sector j using the specification in the first column of Table 2; aj is a
fixed-effect for sector j; and Φ is the cdf of the normal distribution.
In the context of the model, the main coefficients of interest are b1 and b2. The
model predicts that a lower (higher) relative return to skill in Israel versus the US will
entice higher (lower) skilled workers to leave Israel. Formally, this prediction is
represented by b1 < 0 and b2 > 0. These parameters are identified by exploiting
variation across sectors in the difference between Israel and the US in the returns
to education within each sector and testing for whether the relationship between
education and emigration becomes more (less) positive in sectors with a lower
(higher) return to education in Israel versus the US.
It is important to emphasise that we are not assuming that all emigrants move to the
US, although as indicated previously, the US is by far the most likely destination for
Israeli emigrants. Nor do we assume that Israeli emigrants do not change sectors. Our
specification is motivated by the idea that there are substantial switching costs between
occupations due to previous investments in occupation-specific human capital, and
that existing evidence does indicate substantial persistence in the occupational choices
of immigrants after immigration in other contexts (Friedberg, 2000, 2001). If Israelis
do not consider the wage differential between the US and Israel within their own
sector, then the causal effect of these variables should be zero (b1 = 0 and b2 = 0) and
the estimates should be insignificant. In other words, a lot of sector switching or
moving to other countries should only attenuate our estimates.
In terms of defining the sectors, we use either the 12 industrial sectors depicted in
Table 3 or the nine occupations in Table 4. Sectors have to be defined rather broadly
so that we can obtain reasonable estimates of the returns to education and residual
variation (used in the next Section) within each sector. Tables 3 and 4 present the
returns to education within each sector in Israel and the US. Differences in these
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estimates across sectors are the source of the ‘treatment variation’ that is exploited in
the empirical analysis.17
Table 5 presents our results for emigrant selection in terms of education. The
coefficients represent the estimated marginal effect of each explanatory variable
(evaluated at the means of all the explanatory variables) from a probit regression. The
first page defines sectors by industry, while the second page repeats the analysis using
occupation categories as sectors.
The first column of Table 5 uses an interaction between education and the return to
education in sector j in Israel only (no interaction between education and sector j’s
return to education in the US). The estimate is not significant. In the second column,
we include only the interaction with the return to education in the US. This coefficient
turns out to be positive and significant, indicating that higher educated Israelis tend to
leave Israel more if they work in a sector which has a high return to education in the
US. The direction of this effect is consistent with the predictions of the model –
positive selection is larger in a sector with a higher return to general skills abroad.
The third column of Table 5 includes interactions with the returns to education in the
US and Israel. Interestingly, both of the main parameters of interest are now significant
and the magnitudes are much larger than in the first two columns. This pattern is an
important result in the context of the model, since it illustrates the model’s prediction
that the relative returns to skill between the two countries is what matters, not
necessarily the level of inequality or returns to skill in the home or host country alone.18
The fourth column of Table 5 uses a specification which interacts a person’s
education level with the difference in the returns to education between Israel and the
US in his sector. Using this specification, the main parameter of interest is highly
significant and consistent with the model: the probability of emigrating for Israelis with
higher levels of education declines in sectors with a higher relative return to education
in Israel versus the US. The fifth column in Table 5 estimates the same model but
expands the sample to include individuals between the ages of 25 and 50 (instead of
30–40). The coefficient is smaller but still significant. The reduction in magnitude is to
be expected, since many Israelis in their 20s have not finished their BA degree and
emigrants who leave Israel after the age of 40 are probably placing a larger weight on
non-labour market considerations. The last column in the second page of Table 5 uses
a more conservative measure of ‘mover’ by considering an individual an emigrant if he
was out of the country in both 2002 and 2004. The results are robust to this change in
definition of mover status.
The first page of Table 5 presents a similar analysis but defines sectors according to
occupations not industries. Overall, the results using occupations as sectors are similar
to those using industries in one respect but differ in a few important ways. They are
17 Although there is a large literature which examines the bias in the estimated returns to schooling using
a standard Mincer-like regression, this issue should only affect our results if the biases across sectors and
between the US and Israel are somehow systematically related to the selection of emigrants within a sector.
18 In addition, the fact that the results are highly sensitive to the inclusion of the US measures of the
returns to skill indicate that our measured returns to skill in the US and Israel are not simply noisy measures
which are fraught with biases and measurement error. If this were the case, they should not be significant
determinants of the probability to emigrate, and they should not be influencing the other coefficients to such
a high degree.
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similar in the sense that higher educated Israelis tend to leave occupations with a low
return to education in Israel. However, higher educated Israelis also tend not to leave
Israel if the return to education in their occupation in the US is higher. The former
result is consistent with the model but the later one is not. As a result, the specification
which uses the difference in the returns to education between Israel and the US yields
an insignificant coefficient, since the individual coefficients (in the first three columns
of the second page) are of a similar magnitude and have the same sign. That is, the
difference specification masks the two individual effects.
Even though one of the two main coefficients has an unexpected sign, it is worth
noting that the sizes of the coefficients in the occupation level analysis are
considerably smaller than the ones obtained in the industry-level analysis. The
difference in the size of the coefficients, and the direction of one of them, could be
due to the idea that occupational status is already a proxy for education. Much of the
variation in education is between occupations and, therefore, testing for selection by
education within occupations is weakened by the lack of variation. The larger
selection effects obtained in the industry-level analysis are most likely a product of
exploiting a broader range of education levels within each industry. Evidence for this
idea is found by the much lower estimated returns to education within occupations
versus industries, as seen in Tables 3 and 4. In addition, there is naturally more
variation in the industry level analysis which exploits 12 sectors versus eight in the
occupation level results.
3.2. Selection on Unobservables (Residual Wages)
This subsection analyses the prediction of Proposition 1 that the rate of emigration
should be an increasing and then decreasing function of the residual wage, and
Proposition 4’s prediction that a higher relative return to unobservable skill in Israel
versus the US decreases the probability that individuals with higher unobserved skill will
emigrate (i.e. shift the inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and residual
wages to the right). The basic probit specification explains the probability that person i
who works in sector j (before leaving Israel) decides to emigrate from Israel by the
following equation:
PrðMoverijkÞ ¼ Uðc0 þ c1x i þ c2educi þ c3ðresidual wageÞij þ c4ðresidual wageÞ2ij
þ b3ðIsrael residual SDÞjk  ðresidual wageÞij þ b4ðUS residual SDÞjk  ðresidual wageÞij
þ ajkÞ;
where each variable is defined as before except: Israel residual SDjk is the standard
deviation of the residuals within sector j and education group k (k = 1 if person i is a
high school dropout, k = 2 if person i completed only high school and k = 3 if person i
completed college) from the wage regression described in Table 2 using the 1995
Israel census; US residual SDjk is the standard deviation of residuals within sector j and
education group k from the wage regression described in Table 2 using the US CPS
data; and ajk is a fixed-effect for education group k in sector j. The analysis uses a
person’s residual wage within a sector as a measure of his unobservable skill, and the
© 2014 Royal Economic Society.
2016] I N E QU A L I T Y A N D H I G H S K I L L E D I MM I G R A T I O N 1085
residual variation in sector j for education group k as a proxy for the return to
unobservable skill in sector j and education group k.19
Similar to the previous Section, the main coefficients of interest are b3, and b4, and
the model predicts that b3 < 0 and b4 > 0. Table 6 presents our estimates for these
coefficients after defining sectors by industry or occupation. The pattern of results in
Table 6 is similar to the analysis of selection on education in Table 5. All of the
individual interaction coefficients have the expected sign and most are significant. The
difference specification yields highly significant results that are consistent with the
model: a higher return to unobservable skill in Israel induces individuals with high
levels of unobservable skill to stay, while higher returns to unobservable skill in the US
increase the chances for individuals with higher levels of unobservable skill to leave
Israel.
In contrast to the results in Table 5 regarding selection on education, the results
in Table 6 are very similar in terms of selection on unobservable skill in the
industry and occupation level analyses. Again, one possible explanation for this
could be that occupation is already a proxy for education, so this is likely to affect
the results for selection on education levels in a way that does not affect selection
on unobservables (since residuals are computed after controlling for occupation
and education).
3.3. The Magnitude of the Coefficients
So far, we found statistically significant evidence in favour of increased positive
selection on observable and unobservable skill in sectors with a low relative return to
skill in Israel versus the US. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are not easy to
interpret. Therefore, we now use our estimates to present the relationship between
levels of skill and the propensity to emigrate under alternative scenarios. Specifically,
we compute the predicted values of the regression after substituting different relative
returns to skill between Israel and the US, and show how the relationship between skill
and the probability of emigration changes under each scenario.
For example, Figure 6 compares the actual rates of emigration by education level
with the predicted rates (using the estimated parameters in the fourth column of Table
5) after increasing the relative return to education in Israel versus the US by 0.03
(which roughly makes the average return equal in Israel and the US). Overall, Figure 6
shows that almost the entire relationship between education and emigration can be
eliminated if the relative returns to skill were similar to those in the US. This
simulation suggests that the estimated selection parameters are not only significant
statistically but are considerably large in magnitude.
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of selection on unobservable skill, Figure 7
compares the actual emigration rates versus the predicted rates after increasing the
residual variation in each sector by 0.025, which is the overall gap in residual variation
between the two countries. Consistent with the model’s predictions, equalising the
residual variance across the two countries shifts the inverse U-shaped pattern to the
19 There are likely to be differences across education groups within a given sector in the returns to
unobservable skills, so the regression explicitly considers this possibility.
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Table 6
Selection on Unobservables
Industry level analysis
Mover in 2004
Mover in
2002 and
Wage residual in sector i9 0.021 0.030**
Israel residual SD in 0.014 0.013
Sector-education group i
Wage residual in sector i9 0.022 0.037*
US residual SD in 0.017 0.020
Sector-education group i
Wage residual in sector i9 0.032** 0.035 0.021* 0.024
Difference between Israel
and US
0.017 0.026 0.013 0.017
Residual SD in
Sector-education group i
Probit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS Yes
Observations 40,412 70,163 40,412
Ages 30–45 30–45 30–45 30–45 30–45 25–50 30–45
Occuaption level analysis
Mover in 2004
Mover in
2002 and
Wage residual in
sector i9
0.076*** 0.079***
Israel residual SD in 0.022 0.034
Sector-education
group i
Wage residual in
sector i9
0.024 0.030
US residual SD in 0.031 0.032
Sector-education
group i
Wage residual in
sector i9
0.055*** 0.068** 0.027* 0.044**
Difference between
Israel and US
0.020 0.034 0.014 0.021
Residual SD in
Sector-education
group i
Probit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS Yes
Observations 40,412 70,164 40,412
Ages 30–45 30–45 30–45 30–45 30–45 25–50 30–45
Notes. 9 Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Bootstrapped
standard errors (with the first stage estimation of the residual SD within each sector-education group and the
individual’s residual wage) are in parentheses. All specifications include controls for sector by education
group fixed effects, education, the individual’s residual wage, his residual wage squared, marital status,
number of children, native status, age arrived in Israel for non-natives, age, age-squared and dummy variables
for being in the Asia-Africa or European ethnic group. Probit coefficients are the marginal effects calculated
at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
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left, so that the selection of emigrants becomes less positive. However, the size of
the shift is not noticeably large, which may be due in part to the small difference in the
residual variance between the two countries as well as the size of the coefficient itself.
This is seen in Figure 8 which performs a similar exercise using the coefficients from
the occupation-level analysis, which tended to be larger than those in the industry-level
analysis on unobservable skills. When the residual variance is equalised using these
estimates, a much larger shift to the left occurs, thus reducing the positive selection
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based on unobservable skills in a noticeable way, while keeping the overall U-shaped
pattern intact. Overall, these figures show that the parameters governing the selection
process on observable and unobservable skills are significant statistically and also in
magnitude.
4. Conclusion
This study develops a model which describes how a country’s level of income inequality
can sometimes serve as a way to attract high skilled immigrants from other countries, or
retain its own high skilled individuals from leaving. The model highlights the idea that
the sources of inequality, not just the levels, are important determinants of who is likely
to want to leave a given country. In particular, inequality that is determined by general
types of human capital which can be transported to other countries serves to attract
high skilled individuals from home and abroad, while inequality stemming from
country-specific factors tends to keep high-earning individuals at home but does not
serve as an attraction for high earning individuals abroad.
Using a rare data set which contains information on the labour market outcomes of
individuals before they decide to move or not, we provide empirical support for all the
main predictions of the model. In particular, we observe low but positive rates of
emigration for all levels of education and wages, and provide evidence that the returns
to general skills are likely to be higher in the US versus Israel. The range of parameters
in our model which yield these patterns also predict positive emigrant selection in
terms of education and an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and
residual wages. Our data are consistent with both of these predictions and we test the
model further by exploiting differences across sectors in the relative returns to
observable and unobservable skills between Israel and the US. This analysis reveals how
differences in inequality across sectors can explain variation in the patterns of
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emigrant selection in a manner which is consistent with our model. Namely, a higher
relative return to general human capital abroad makes the selection of emigrants more
positive in terms of education or residual wages, while keeping the overall shape of the
function intact.
These findings support the idea in Borjas (1987) that a higher return to skill abroad
not only creates higher inequality there but also makes it a more attractive destination
for high skill immigrants from all other countries. However, we show that an important
distinction between general and ‘country-specific’ skills is necessary to make this
prediction consistent with the observed non-monotonic relationship between emigra-
tion and residual wages. In this manner, our article highlights the idea that a country’s
level and sources of inequality will determine how a country competes internationally
to attract high skill immigrants from abroad, and to keep their own high skilled
workers at home.
Hebrew University CEPR, and IZA
University of Warwick, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, CAGE and CEPR
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
Appendix A. Simulation Results with the Normal Distribution.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 4.
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